Duncan Pritchard (2007: 277) rightly observes that ' [i] t is a platitude in epistemology to say that knowledge excludes luck'. On the reading relevant to present purposes, this epistemological anti-luck platitude is a generalization intended to capture widespread intuitive reactions to Gettier Cases : cases similar to those Gettier (1963) employed to show that justified true belief doesn't suffice for knowledge.
1 The pertinent reading of the anti-luck platitude is the one that Dancy (1985: 134) expresses in the following passage:
This was just the point of the Gettier counterexamples; nothing in the tripartite definition [of knowledge as epistemically justified true belief] excluded knowledge by luck.
Here's a pair of familiar Gettier Cases that I'll refer to, throughout this chapter and the next one, as 'the Classics':
Pocket Change: Smith knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith also has strong evidence that Jones will get the job they've both applied for. Smith infers that the successful candidate has ten coins in his pocket. In fact, it's Smith (not Jones) who will get the job. And, having just grabbed a handful of loose change, Smith happens to now have ten coins in his own pocket. Smith doesn't know that the successful candidate has ten coins in his pocket, notwithstanding the fact that the indicated proposition is true and Smith justifiedly believes it. Likewise, Roddy doesn't know that there's a sheep in the field before him, notwithstanding the fact that the indicated proposition is true and Roddy justifiedly believes it. In light of (a) the important distinction between an event's (merely) being lucky for you and its being a stroke of good luck for you (Section 1.3), along with (b) the recognition that the epistemological anti-luck platitude is a generalization meant to capture widespread intuitive reactions to Gettier Cases, we can charitably sharpen up the expressions of the anti-luck platitude found in the above quotations from Dancy and Pritchard as follows: Even if you're justified in your true belief that P, you don't know that P so long as it's just a stroke of good luck for you that you believe accurately that P.
Let's say that a gettiered belief is one that falls short of knowledge in the way illustrated by cases such as the Classics. What, exactly, has happened to a belief that falls short of knowledge in the way such cases illustrate? What, precisely, is gettiered belief? And does this phenomenon have any essential connection to luck, as common luck-involving expressions of widespread intuitive reactions to Gettier Cases so strongly suggest? I'll explore these questions throughout this chapter and the next one.
2 After generating an initial catalog of ways that luck can figure in cognition, I'll argue that each of the indicated ways is compatible with knowledge and thus constitutes a distinct kind of benign epistemic luck (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Then, after introducing two leading substantive answers to the question what is gettiered belief -the Ease of Mistake Approach and the Lack of Credit Approach -I'll further explain the former approach and then present examples establishing that it's both too weak and too strong (Sections 3.3 through 3.5). Next, after showing how the counterexamples to the Ease of Mistake Approach can motivate the Lack of Credit Approach, I'll explain two versions of the latter approach and then present examples establishing that each version is both too weak and too strong (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). I'll then introduce and critically assess two additional, less prominent approaches to gettiered belief -one of which, I'll argue at some length, shows real promise not only of properly handling all the cases that bedevil competing accounts but also of yielding a plausible explanation of the superiority of knowledge to gettiered belief (Sections 4.4 through 4.6). And as I've already indicated, throughout this chapter and the next one, we'll be keeping an eye on the question how helpful or illuminating those common luck-involving expressions of the platitude that knowledge excludes gettiered belief really are.
